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Прилади, що фіксують зображення: загроза чи благо?
Автори статті «зважили» переваги та загрози втручання у приватне життя, що вини-
кають внаслідок використанням безпілотних літальних апаратів (дронів) і відеореєстратора. 
Аналізуючи та порівнюючи законодавство двох географічно, історично та культурно близьких 
країн – Латвії та Литви, вони вказують на відмінності в законодавчому врегулюванні питань 
конфіденційності, проблемні аспекти їх чинного національного законодавства щодо використання 
технологій та захисту приватного життя, а також пропонують можливі рішення щодо врегулю-
вання виявлених правових прогалин.
Порівняння двох законодавств, які регулюють однакові питання конфіденційності та вико-
ристання камер UAS та панелі приладів, засвідчує, що національне законодавство, навіть відпо-
відно до одного – законодавства Європейського Союзу – може захистити таку саму цінність 
різними правовими інструментами. Кожне законодавство – литовське та латвійське – має свої 
переваги та недоліки, але можна підтвердити, що закон не завжди йде в ногу з швидким розвит-
ком технологій. Як було показано, з особливими коригуваннями щодо ідентифікації користувачів 
камер UAS та панелі приладів, з упровадженням правових інструментів, що дозволяють потерпі-
лій стороні ефективно захищати власність у випадках, коли користувачі персональної інформації 
є особами, що збирають особисту інформацію не в комерційних цілях, можна знайти правильний 
баланс між цими двома цінностями – соціальною безпекою та власністю.
Переваги нових технологій не можна було заперечувати, тому було б безглуздо говорити, що 
вони не є необхідними, оскільки викликають велику небезпеку для нашої власності. Власність як 
цінність не може бути абсолютною. Тому важливо адаптувати правові механізми до мінливих 
загроз основним цінностям, таким як власність. Таким чином, відсутність правових заходів не 
може бути підставою для втручання в технологічний розвиток: не слід розглядати нові технології 
як загрозу, а правові норми повинні бути вдосконалені і пристосовані до постійно мінливого світу.
Ключові слова: безпілотні літальні апарати; дрони; відеореєстратори; власність; Латвія; 
Литовська Республіка.
Introduction. Lithuanians have a saying that instead of hearing a hundred times 
it is better to see once. Such saying confirms that visual means convey most of the 
information. Thus, it could be said that filming devices are the best tool to collect 
the most accurate information. However, along with the development of image cap-
turing devices and other technologies, people’s concern about their privacy grows. 
And this could be confirmed by the General Data Protection Regulation (herein-
after – GDPR)1 which came into force just recently.  The fact that the necessity of 
such regulation was noticed by the European Union proves that people’s private 
information as a part of their right to private life, had been in danger. The same, 
confirming the no velty and actuality of the topic, is stated in the preamble of the 
GDPR: «Rapid technological developments and globalisation have brought new chal-
lenges for the protection of personal data. The scale of the collection and sharing of 
personal data has increased significantly. Technology allows both private companies 
and public authorities to make use of personal data on an unprecedented scale in order 
to pursue their activities.»2 Adding to the latter, the GDPR does not apply to the 
processing of personal data by a natural person in the course of a purely personal 
1 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on 
the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 
OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1–88.
2 Ibid: preamble point 6.
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or household activity and thus with no connection to a professional or commercial 
activity,1 but technologies serve not only private companies and public authorities, 
but also natural persons in collecting of personal data for various purposes, inclu-
ding illegal ones. 
On the other hand, the image capturing devices give people immense oppor-
tunities and to be able  to enjoy them it is worth working on the adjustment of 
current legislation in order to find the right balance between the value given by 
the technologies in-topic (security) and the other value that is so much in-danger 
nowadays (privacy). The latter forms the research problem. So in this research 
the answer on how the current legal regulation could be adjusted in order to find 
that balance, is given.
By comparing and indicating the problematic aspects of current national Lat-
vian and Lithuanian regulation on the usage of technologies in-topic and privacy 
protection, the authors aim to prove that even though the regulation on protection 
of particular values could differ in different jurisdictions or even be insufficient, the 
image capturing devices still make a great contribution to societal security therefore 
their use cannot be denied. In order to adjust their impact on privacy, prevent, tackle 
breaches of privacy, it is necessary to suggest the correction of legal rules.   
1. Image capturing devices and their contribution to societal security
1.1. Justification of the choice of particular image capturing devices
There exist many image capturing devices. But two types of them are very 
specific – unmanned aerial systems (hereinafter – UAS) and dashboard cameras 
(cameras mounted in cars/car cameras). These devices have some things incommon: 
they both are mainly used to capture images (videos) and they are moving, therefore 
it allows their operators to remain unidentified and in such way to avoid liability. 
UAS and dashboard cameras are specifically chosen as a research object because their 
use is widespread and at the same time very specific: for example, video surveillance 
can be carried out secrectly – when the filmed person does not even realise he/she 
is being filmed. Also, the UAS  can capture videos of the places that could not be 
achieved easily (for example, private, closed, fenced yards or premises), dashboard 
cameras, if not specially marked, could be imperceptible but at the same time col-
lecting a lot of information and very often the object observed cannot even choose 
whether to allow such observation or not (for example, working dashboard camera 
in a traffic flow or  an object could be secretly monitored if a car with a dashboard 
camera on was left in some area)2. Such characteristics make the two devices more 
specific and worth deeper analysis and because images convey most of the informa-
tion and peoples’ right to privacy could be easily breached by video capture, posses-
sion and distribution, these two technologies, as the most threatening the privacy, 
are chosen as an object of this article. 
1 Ibid: preamble point18.
2 Bučiūnas, G. (2015). Vaizdo registratoriai ir asmens privatumas, Mokslo taikomieji tyrimai Lietuvos 
kolegijose, Vol. 1, No. 11: 65.
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1.2. Image capturing devices and their relation to societal security 
The understanding of security has been changing all the time. If in the XVII’th 
century, when the Treaty of Westphalia was signed, security was understood as a 
peaceful settlement of disputes among the states,1 nowadays, when people seek for 
more comfortable living, use more technologies, such as UAS, dashboard cameras, 
which have overtaken a part of our privacy, without the traditional security percep-
tion, new forms of security have evolved.2
According to the European Union open data, economic and financial matters 
are one of the biggest challenges to the security of European Union citizens, after 
terrorism.3 Therefore it could be said that the economic wellfare is one of the most 
important elements of people‘s security. As it will be seen later, the image capturing 
devices make a great positive influence on economy, whereas economy is one of the 
areas related to pepople‘s security. Furthermore, it could not be denied that one of 
the most important factors determining people’s sence of security is their physical 
safety from various threats (crimes, terrorism, environmental factors). Thus,  the 
term ‘societal security’ is used in this article, as it encompasses not only physical 
safety, but general use for society and individuals, including safety assurance, eco-
nomical use, people’s emotional satisfaction. 
Many authors have analysed the importance of technologies, such as drones 
and dashboards cameras and their contribution to individual and public welfare. 
For example, J. Villasenor4 stresses that theres is an endless variety of civil applica-
tions that the UAS can be employed in and that overwhelming majority of them 
is beneficial. This author, as well as Martin McKown5, stresses puporses that UAS 
could be used for: people’s search and resque operations, surveying, traffic conges-
tion monitoring, air quality assessment, wildlife tracking. As the main topic drone’s 
use in monitoring soil residue cover is analysed by other authors6; A.G. Entrop and 
A. Vasenev7, as well as others8 highlight the UAS’s use in construction industry, 
1 Vadapalas, V. (1998). Tarptautinė teisė. Bendroji dalis (International Law. General Part), Vilnius: 
Eugrimas: 76.
2 Puraite, A, Silinske, N. (2017). Understanding the concept of security: theoretical approach. Public 
Security and Public Order, Vol. 19: 136.
3 EU Open Data Portal, „Special Eurobarometer 432: Europeans’ attitudes towards security.” (2015). 
Retrieved 25.11.2017 from http://data.europa.eu/euodp/en/data/dataset/S2085_83_2_432_ENG/
resource/ae0b54bc-3974-4165-9f7d-c2907cb3f41f. 
4 Villasenor, J. (2013). Observation from above: Unmaneed Aircraft Systems and Privacy. Harvard 
Journal of Law and Public Policy, Vol 36: 459. 
5 McKown, M. (2015). The New Drone State: Suggestions for Legislatures Seeking to Limit Drone 
Surveillance by Government and Nongovernment Controllers, University of Florida Journal of Law 
and Public Policy, vol. 26: 76.
6 Kavoosi, Z., Hossein Raoufat, M., Dehghaani, M., Jafari, A., Kazemeini, A., Jafar Naazemossadat, M. 
(2018). Feasibility of satellite and drone images for monitoring soil residue cover, Journal of the Saudi 
Society of Agricultural Sciences, „in press“ version. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jssas.2018.06.001.
7 Entrop, A.G., Vasenev, A. (2017). Infrared Drones in the Construction Industry: Designing a Protocol 
for Building Thermography Procedures, Energy Procedia, Vol. 132.
8 Dupont, Q. F. M., Chua, D. K.H., Tashrif, A., Abbott, E. L.S. (2017). Potential Applications of UAV 
along the Contruction‘s Value Chain, Procedia Engineering, Vol. 182.
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whereas other authors name UAS as being used to observe, analyze and evaluate the 
traffic flow as well as safety conditions.1 It is also worth mentioning professional or 
leisure photography, recreational purposes of UAS as the most popular ways of use 
among regular users of UAS. Whereas as the main advantages of dashboard cameras 
ensurance of secure driving2, provision of information about the details of traffic 
accidents, helping to avoid disputes on factual circumstances, as well as ensurance 
of public security, crime prevention, also taxi drivers’ tool helping to ensure their 
security and dashboard cameras recreational purpose (for example, videos about 
family road trips)3 are mentioned.
Most of the abovementioned advantages of the technologies make a great influ-
ence on economy. European Drones Outlook Study carried out by The SESAR Joint 
Undertaking, disclosed that the growing drone market shows significant potential: 
economic impact analysis of the entire value chain for each of the areas of demand 
revealed the potential for a European market exceeding 10 billion annually by 2035 
and 15 billion annually by 2050.4 The development of market also provides new 
jobs throughout all Mebmer States. It is summarized that over 100 000 jobs are 
estimated to be created with a market this significant.5 Additionally,  even though 
the forecast has been prepared on the basis of number assumptions,6 the conclusion 
is that taking into consideration even more conservative assumptions, the foreseen 
growth is still significant.7
Also, unofficial sources disclose that  in 2013 only 1 percent of motorists used 
dashboard cameras in the UK. In 2017 that figure had jumped to 15 percent. Mar-
ket estimates suggest a further 30 percent of motorists plan to use one in the near 
future in the UK.8
These advantages and the ways of use of the technologies undeniably confirm 
that their impact on societal security is significant. 
1 Khan, M. A., Ectors, W., Bellemans, T., Ruichek, Y., Yasar, A. H., Janssens, D., Wets, G. (2018). 
Unmanned Aerial-Vehicle Based Traffic Analysis: A Case Study to Analyze Traffic Streams at Urban 
Roundabouts, Procedia Computer Science, Vol. 130.
2 Rogavichene, L., Garmonnikov, I. (2017). Innovative Technologies for Assessment and Correction of 
the Driving Style, Transportation Research Procedia, Vol. 20.
3 Nauwelaerts, W., World Data Protection Report: Guidelines on Use of Dashboard Cameras 
(2014), retrieved 06.05.2018 from https://www.hunton.com/files/Publication/a75c66a4-2f6f-
4e3e-a83b-543923987393/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/580a5a0c-66f6-4cee-834c-
8b41b637fd09/Guidelines_on_Use_of_Dashboard_Cameras.pdf
4 SESAR, European Dornes Outlook Study, Retrieved 01.02.2018 from https://www.sesarju.eu/sites/
default/files/documents/reports/European_Drones_Outlook_Study_2016.pdf: 29.
5 Ibid: 29.
6 Ibid: 2.
7 Ibid: 29.
8The Telegraph, retreived 06.05.2018 from https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/risk-insights/
dashcam-benefits/.
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2. Privacy and risk to breach it in the context of the use of image capturing 
devices
2.1. Privacy concept and its protection by relevant legal acts
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that no one shall be subject 
to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home and that everyone has the 
right to the protection of the law against such interference.1 The right to privacy is 
also enshrined in the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms. 2 Its Article 8(2) states that the interference by a public autho-
rity with the exercise of this right is allowed only in accordance with the law and 
only if necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public 
safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or 
crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others. 
European Court of Human Rights in one of its decisions stated that the notion 
of private life should be interpreted broadly but not restrictively and that such 
interpretation means that personal information is any information relating to an 
identified or identifiable individual.3 It proves that any information collected by 
image capturing devices even indirectly connected with a person which could be 
identified by it, is considered personal data. 
Furthermore, in the European Union level the right to privacy is also protected 
by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,4 as well as regulated 
in the GDPR which intends to protect natural persons’ personal data as a «third 
generation» fundamental right. 
By national legal acts the right to privacy is protected at the national level. In 
Lithuanian legislation the right to privacy is described in various legal acts. Besides 
the main legal act – the Constituion, enshrining people’s right to privacy5, there 
is the Law on Personal Data Legal Protection of the Republic of Lithuania (here-
inafter – LPDLP) which is in accordance with the GDPR and protects personal 
information, but does not apply to the processing of personal data by a natural 
person with no connection to a professional or commercial activity.6 As the national 
1 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, Paris.  Retrieved from http://www.un.org/en/
universal-declaration-human-rights/: 12.
2 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by 
Protocols Nos. 11 and 14. 1950, ETS 5 // http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3b04.html: 8.
3 Amann v. Switzerland, no. 27798/95, §65, ECHR 2000-II.
4 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 7.12.2000, OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, p. 391–
407: 7,8.
5 Lietuvos Respublikos Konstitucija (Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania), Official Gazette (1992, 
no. 220, 33-1014): Art 22  states that The private life of an individual shall be inviolable. Personal 
correspondence, telephone conversations, telegraph messages, and other intercommunications shall 
be inviolable. Information concerning the private life of an individual may be collected only upon a 
justified court order and in accordance with the law. The law and the court shall protect individuals 
from arbitrary or unlawful interference in their private or family life, and from encroachment upon 
their honour and dignity
6 Lietuvos Respublikos asmens duomenų teisinės apsaugos įstatymas (Law on Personal Data Legal 
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legislation must correspond to the European union legislation, the LPDLP was 
changed just after the GDPR came into force so that it corrpesponded with the lat-
ter. After the newest changes, the separate article connected with video surveillance 
has expired therefore Lithuania does not have any special rules on video surveil-
lance any more and does not have any special separate regulation on the usage of 
dashboard cameras. There is only an act governing the usage of UAS, which is called 
«The rules for the use of unmanned aircrafts» (hereinafter – the Rules).1 Unfortu-
nately, trying to find a hint about protection of privacy in the Rules will fail, as they 
are intended to set only physical safety requirements of the usage of UAS.2 On the 
contrary to its predecessors, we will find some privacy protection rules in the Regu-
lation EU 2018/1139, which came into force just recently.3 The latter stresses that 
unmanned aircrafts present risks for privacy, protection of personal data, therefore 
the requirements concerning the registration of unmanned aircraft and of operators 
of unmanned aircraft  should be laid down (also, the Regulation sets the essential 
requirements for registration) and that it is also necessary to establish digital, 
harmonised and interoperable national registration systems in which information, 
including the same basic data, about unmanned aircraft and operators of unmanned 
aircraft registered.4  
Lithuania also has a Civil Code which establishes the inviolability of the indi-
vidual’s privacy and stresses that a person’s private life may be made public only 
with that person’s consent.5 The following point of the same article concretizes what 
a violation of a person’s private life is and lists actions, such as unlawful invasion 
of person’s dwelling or other private premises as well as fenced private territory, 
observation of one’s private life, unlawful search of the person or his property, etc.; 
and states that the given list is not finite. The regulation of the Civil code is special 
because the rules on privacy protection, set in it, are applied to natural persons as 
well and they enable the party whose legitimate interests have been violated, to 
take legal remedies, including requesting for the compensation. However, in order to 
apply civil liability, all four conditions of the civil liability, must be proved - unlaw-
Protection of the Republic of Lithuania), Official Gazette, 1996, No. 63-1479; 2000, No. 64-1924; 
2003, No. 15-597; 2008, No. 22-804; TAR, 2018-07-11, No. 2018-11733: 1.
1 Bepiločių orlaivių naudojimo taisyklės (The rules for the use of unmanned aircrafts). TAR, 2014, No. 
2014-00438.
2 Puraite, A., Bereikiene D., Silinske, N. (2017). Regulation of Unmanned Aerial Systems and Related 
Privacy Issues in Lithuania, Baltic Journal of Law and Politics, Vol. 10: 118.
3 Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2018 on 
common rules in the field of civil aviation and establishing a European Union Aviation Safety 
Agency, and amending Regulations (EC) No 2111/2005, (EC) No 1008/2008, (EU) No 996/2010, 
(EU) No 376/2014 and Directives 2014/30/EU and 2014/53/EU of the European Parliament 
and of the Council, and repealing Regulations (EC) No 552/2004 and (EC) No 216/2008 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (EEC) No 3922/91 (Text with 
EEA relevance.), OJ L 212, 22.8.2018, p. 1–122.
4 Ibid: preamble, point 31.
5 Lietuvos Respublikos civilinis kodeksas (Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania), Official Gazette 
(2000), No. 74-2262; 200: 2.23.
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ful actions (for example, breach of article 2.23 of the Civil Code of the Republic of 
Lithuania or any other legal act guaranteeing the right to privacy), causation (only 
damages related to unlawful actions can be compensated), fault (article 6.248(1) of 
the Civil Code of Republic of Lithuania states: «Civil liability shall arise only upon 
the existence of the fault of the obligated person, except in the cases established by 
laws or a contract when civil liability arises without fault») and damage.1 Taking 
into consideration the specifisity of UAS and dashboard cameras, proving unlaw-
ful actions would be quite difficult, whereas proving damage – even harder. This 
explains why there are no civil cases of privacy defence against illegal usage of UAS 
and dashboard cameras in Lithuania.
Article 2.22 of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania protects natural 
person’s right to an image. Photograph (or its part) or some other image of a natural 
person may be reproduced, sold, demonstrated, published and the person may be 
photographed only with his/her consent. However, the consent shall not be required 
if such acts are related to person’s public activities, his official post, request of law 
enforcement agencies or where a person is photographed in public places, but are 
not allowed to be demonstrated, reproduced or sold only if those acts were to abase 
person’s honour, dignity or damage his professional reputation.2 This article is closely 
related to the usage of UAS and dashboard cameras as person’s image is the best 
source of his identification therefore is one of the components of the right to privacy. 
The authors believe that even if a person is being photographed (filmed) in a public 
place, but shows clear disagreement of that, such filming should be discontinued, as 
the person in public places does not loose the protection of his/her privacy. Such 
attitude corresponds with and is based on Lithuanian case law which says that «a 
person even being in a public place, does not loose his/her individuality and privacy, 
therefore a subjective inner possition of a person photographed is important; if such 
person clearly and unambiguously expresses his/her unwillingness to be photographed, 
it must be respected».3 Under current Lithuanian regulation, to be more precise, lack 
of regulation, to express unwillingness to be photographed (filmed) by usage of a 
dashboard camera or UAS is impossible as the person filmed in most of the cases 
does not even know about it. Thus, using dasboard cameras without special marking 
informing others about filming, equates to secret filming, therefore it takes away the 
opportunity to express clear disagreement with the ongoing process. Furthermore, 
even special marking does not prevent from privacy breaches (breaches of a person’s 
right to an image), as the person filmed, even noticing the marked car, could not 
have a chance to express his/her disagreement (for example, if the car is moving 
fast). Therefore, stricter regulation on the usage of footage is essential (for example, 
clear prohibition to make public videos, taken by dashboard cameras, in which pri-
vate information (for example, car number plates) or people’s faces could be seen, 
except for reasons, such as public interest, disclosure of violations of the law. 
1 Ibid: 6.246, 6.247, 6.248.
2 Ibid: 2.22.
3 J. A., UAB „Lietuvos rytas”. Ruling of the Supreme Court of Lithuania, 2004, No. 3K-3-91/2004.
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Protection of privacy is enshrined in Lithuanian administrative and criminal law. 
However, the code of administrative offences sets the fines only for unauthorized 
processing of personal data and privacy breach in the area of electronic communi-
cations (applied for activities of entities, providing or entitled to provide a public 
communications network or related facilities only1) and for the breaches of LPDLP2, 
which also applies to business entities only. However, the code also sets the prohibi-
tion to breach The rules for the use of unmanned aircrafts.3 Even though, as it was 
mentioned earlier, they are designed to regulate questions of security on the usage 
of UAS, at the same time this administrative tool could be used to defend interests 
of privacy subjects (if noticed that the UAS is being flown over private area and 
requirements of distance, location are breached, the injured person on the grounds 
of these rules could request for stopping the UAS monitoring activities).
Section XXIV of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania sets the crimes 
related to inviolability of private life. Among the crimes mentioned there are articles 
criminalizing trespass,4 illegal collection of information about a person’s private life 
and making available to the public,5 exploitation, or exploitation for the benefit of 
third parties information about someone’s private life without his consent if this 
information was received for the accused person’s service, profession or during the 
performance of temporary task, or by committing one of the crimes named above6. 
However, because none of these crimes are classified as the crimes for negligent 
commitment of which the prosecution is allowed, in order to arraign on earlier men-
tioned crime charges, direct intention to commit a crime must be proven.7 Thus, in 
case of the usage of the image capturing devices analysed, it would be very difficult 
to prove direct intention of the breacher of the right to privacy. 
It is obvious that «privacy is a culture-specific: the matters which a particular 
society regards as ‘private’ can vary widely».8 Even very gerographically, historically 
and culturally close countries, could have quite a different regulation on privacy and 
its protection. For example, even though the privacy in Latvia is also protected by 
the legal act of supreme power – the Constitution9, but the most detailed regulation 
1 Elektroninių ryšių įstatymas (Law on Electronic Communications). Official Gazette, 2004, No. 
69-2382: 32;  Lietuvos Respublikos administracinių nusižengimų kodeksas (Code of Administrative 
Offences of the Republic of Lithuania). TAR, 2015, no. 2015-11216: 83.
2 Lietuvos Respublikos administracinių nusižengimų kodeksas( ibid): 82.
3 Ibid: 393(2).
4 Lietuvos Respublikos baudžiamasis kodeksas  (Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania). Official 
Gazette, 2000, No. 89-2741: 165.
5 Ibid: 167.
6 Ibid: 168.
7 Ibid: 16(4) („A person shall be punishable for commission of a crime or misdemeanour through 
negligence solely in the cases provided for separately in the Special Part of this Code“). See also S.B., 
V.B., R.B. Ruling of Taurage District Court, 2011, No. PK-72-635/2011; 
8 Requoted from Michael, J. (1994). Privacy and Human Rights: International and Comparative Study, 
with Special Reference to developments information technology. Dartmouth: Unesco Publishing: 2.
9 Constitution of the Republic of Latvia, Adopted on 15.02.1922. Published: Latvijas Vestnesis, 01/07, 
13.06.43. Last amendments 08.04.2009: 96: „Everyone has the right to inviolability of his or her 
private life, home and correspondence“
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on personal data protection in Latvia is set in the recent Personal Data Processing 
Law1, which since 5th July 2018 replaced Personal Data Protection Law.2 Its prede-
cessor, contrary to Lithuanian situation, did not set any special conditions under 
the existence of which precisely video surveillance was  allowed (only paragraph 7 
obliged to make sure that at least one of the six conditions exists in order to generally 
process personal data). Whereas in the new Latvian law – Personal Data Processing 
Law, separate article is dedicated precisely to the conditions of video surveillance 
(and especially carried out by dashboard cameras) and it says that «The requirements 
of this Law and the Data Regulation do not apply to the processing of data by natural 
persons using automated data recording devices for road traffic, personal or household 
needs.» In the same article it is also stressed that «It is prohibited to disclose the records 
obtained in road traffic to other persons and institutions, except when one of the bases 
of data processing specified in the data regulation is found. The requirements of this 
Law and the Data Regulation do not apply to the processing of data by natural persons 
using automated video surveillance devices for personal or household use.»3 Thus, the 
provision does not only set the rules on video surveillance in traffic (that it is forbid-
den to disclose the records), but also confirms the specificity of dashboard cameras 
as a data collection device. What is interesting that even though Latvian laws, on 
the contrary to Lithuanian, do not distinguish person’s right to an image (including 
his/her right to expressively dissagree of being filmed), but, again, on the contrary to 
Lithuaniam regulation, they clearly state that  records obtained by dashboard cameras 
cannot be disclosed to other persons and institutions (except for separately indicated 
cases).4 Furthermore, the same article also states that it is prohibited to disclose the 
records obtained in road traffic to other persons and institutions, except when one 
of the bases of data processing specified in the data regulation is found (see GDPR 
Article 6(1)), whereas Lithuanian Civil Code does not protect privacy subjects from 
their images, taken in public, being demonstrated publicly if they do not harm the 
subjects’ reputation, honor, dignity.5 Thus, if a dashboard camera recorded a video in 
which a person could be recognized and this video was made public, under Lithuanian 
law, no offence is made, as the dignity, honor and reputation of the person in the 
video has not been breached. So, it could be said that the person was filmed without 
even knowing it and without being able to express his disagreement with the process 
despite the fact that he or she did not want to be recognized as being in particular 
place at the particular time or driving a/sitting in a particular car. 
Furthermore, Latvian civil code, on the contrary to Lithaunian, does not gov-
ern privacy questions at all. However, abundance of privacy-protecting articles in 
1 Personal Data Processing Law. Published: Latvijas Vēstnesis , 04.07.2018, 132 (6218), available at: 
https://likumi.lv/ta/id/300099-fizisko-personu-datu-apstrades-likums.
2 Personal Data Protection Law. Published: Latvijas Vēstnesis, 06.04.2000, 123/124 (2034/2035), 
«The Reporter», 9, May 4, 2000, available at: https://likumi.lv/ta/id/4042-fizisko-personu-datu-
aizsardzibas-likums.
3 Personal Data Processing Law, supra note 44: 36.
4 Ibid: 36(2).
5 Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania, supra note 31: 2.22 (2).
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administrative and criminal codes proves legislator’s responsible attitude towards 
privacy. For example, Administrative violations’ code of Latvia sets the offences con-
nected with the breaches of private life and applicable in the usage of image capturing 
devices (illegal activities with personal data (including data collection, registration, 
entry, storage, arrangement, modification, use, transfer, transmission, disclosure, blo-
cking or deletion),1 failure to provide information to the data subject,2 processing of 
personal data without registration3. Furthermore, if these articles are not sufficient 
to protect natural person from his privacy breaches commited by usage of image 
capturing devices, other articles, punishing the offender for the breaches of usage of, 
for example, UAS, could be used (for example, Article 1141). However,  it is important 
to stress that the disposition of this article describes only activities connected with 
aircrafts, whereas UAS under the national rules on UAS usage («Procedures for the 
Conduct of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Other Types of Aircraft which do not 
Classify as Aircraft» (hereinafter – UA Rules),4  are not treated as aircrafts.5 However, 
as there are no any specific article connected with the breaches of this article is being 
used by analogy. Besides, the right to privacy which could be breached by the usage 
of image capturing devices, is also protected by the Criminal Law of Latvia, which 
criminalizes violation of the privacy of a person6 and illegal activities with personal 
data.7 It is important to stress that Latvian case law and scholars have not yet con-
firmed that entering a private territory with the help of a device (for example UAS) 
is the breach of person’s privacy, therefore it is still treated that the person himself/
hereself has to enter the private territory in order to commit a crime.8
Even though Latvia, as well as Lithuania, does not have separate regulation on 
the usage of dashboard cameras, but it also has special regulation on the usage of 
UAS (UA Rules). On the contrary to Lithuanian Rules, UA Rules at least mention 
the respect for privacy in the course of usage of the UAS: «Unmanned aircraft flights 
shall be performed so as not to endanger human life, health, privacy or property, flight 
safety and security, not to cause harm to the environment, and also not to endanger 
the State defence and security interests»,9 but no further special privacy protection 
1 Code of Administrative Violations of the Republic of Latvia. Published: Reporters, 20.12.1984, 51, 
available at: https://likumi.lv/ta/id/89648-latvijas-administrativo-parkapumu-kodekss: 204-7
2 Ibid: 204-8.
3 Ibid: 204-9.
4 Procedures for the Conduct of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Other Types of Aircraft which do not 
Classify as Aircraft. Adopted on 22.11.2016. Published: Latvijas Vestnesis, 28.11.2016, 231 (5803), 
available at: https://likumi.lv/ta/id/286823-kartiba-kada-veicami-bezpilota-gaisa-kugu-un-tadu-
cita-veida-lidaparatu-lidojumi-kuri-nav-kvalificejami-ka-gaisa-kugi.
5 Ibid: 1.
6 Criminal Law. Published: Latvijas Vēstnesis, 08.07.1998, 199/200 (1260/1261), «The Reporter», 
04.08.1998, 15, available at: https://likumi.lv/doc.php?id=88966: 143.
7 Ibid: 145.
8 Krastiņš, U., Liholaja, V. (2016). Krimināllikuma komentāri. Otrā daļa (IX-XVII nodaļa). Rīga: Tiesu 
namu aģentūra, pp 341, 352.
9 Procedures for the Conduct of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Other Types of Aircraft which do not 
Classify as Aircraft, supra note 52: 8.
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provisions could be found in this act. However, it is important to stress that, on the 
contrary to Lithuanian Rules, UA Rules contain provisions obliging the owner of 
the UAS to label the device with the given name and surname (for legal persons – 
company name) of the owner or possessor thereof, address of the declared place of 
residence (for legal persons – legal address) and phone number.1 This obligation 
corresponds with the recommendations set in the Regulation EU 2018/1139 (as 
it was mentioned earlier – to make sure that the UAS is identifiable).2 Also, the 
UA rules oblige the pilot of unmanned aircraft be identifiable.3 These requirements 
ensure easy determination and identification of the person managing the UAS in 
cases when there is a question of any kind of liability and in such way serve not only 
for safety ensurance but for privacy protection as well (when the responsible person 
concerning privacy breaches must be found or illegal obserevation of private areas 
has to be interrupted). These requirements are useful and practical steps towards 
realistic, not only formal, implementation of privacy protection. However, modeling 
situation that a person breaches the requirements of the device and self identification 
assuranace, it would still be very hard to identify the offender (in case of privacy 
breaches when using UAS).  
As it was mentioned earlier, netiher Lithuania has special regulation, nor Lat-
via has detailed regulation on dashboard cameras’ use and even though there are 
plenty of rules concerning privacy protection in criminal, administrative law acts, 
as well as in civil ones (in Lithuania), but if it is impossible to identify the offender 
of someone’s privacy, all these acts are vain. So, in order to ensure the identifica-
tion of a manager of an image capturing device, besides obligations enshrined in 
Latvian UA rules (to make sure the device and its operator are identifiable) it is 
also recommended to oblige to appropriately mark cars (for example, with camera 
signs and driver’s contact details) in which dashboard cameras are used so that other 
road users are informed about personal data being collected. If determined that no 
appropriate marking is used, administrative fines must be set. 
As it was noticed, Lithuanian and Latvian legislation on privacy protection 
differs:  in the Lithuanian legislation on the usage of UAS there is a lack of rules 
actually ensuring the protection of privacy. The same problem is with dashboard 
cameras in both countries compared: none of them sets the requirement to specifi-
cally mark the cars in which dashboard camera is being used, therefore neither the 
dashboard camera users are motivated to act in such a manner that other people’s 
privacy is respected (for example, knowing that others are informed about a dash-
board camera being used, its user is more motivated to act in a propper manner), 
nor potential injured persons can protect themselves from being filmed or know to 
1 Procedures for the Conduct of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Other Types of Aircraft which do not 
Classify as Aircraft, supra note 52: 8.
2 EU, “Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2018 
on common rules in the field of civil aviation and establishing a European Union Aviation Safety 
Agency ”, supra note 31: Anex IX, p. 1.3.
3 Procedures for the Conduct of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Other Types of Aircraft which do not 
Classify as Aircraft, supra note 52: 28. 
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whom express their disagreement to be filmed; Latvian criminal law (or case law) has 
not yet reflected the development of technologies and the threat they could cause, 
therefore watching private territories with UAS is not treated as transgression of 
inviolability of the apartment of a person. Thus, if a person in Lithuania could defend 
his/her privacy on the basis of Civil code which protects person‘s right to privacy, 
in Latvia the injured person could invoke criminal and administrative laws only (as 
Latvian Civil law does not contain provisions neither on privacy protection nor on 
people‘s right to an image). 
The protection of personal data, as a part of the right to privacy, is very impor-
tant and as stated in the preamble of the GDPR is officially treated as the funda-
mental one.1 However, the authors of this article agree with professor David Flaherty 
who has stated that the right to privacy «is not identical to such fundamental values 
as liberty, freedom, and democracy».2 This could also be confirmed by the rulings of 
European Court of Human Rights which allowed for certain limitations by stating 
that it would be too restrictive to limit the notion of «private life» to an «inner 
circle» in which the individual may live his or her own personal life as he or she 
chooses, thus excluding entirely the outside world not encompassed within that 
circle.3 So, no legal act can protect people’s privacy in such a manner that particular 
individual is totally protected from outside world. In such case whatever threatens 
privacy, would have to be forbidden. But on the other hand, the limitations of the 
protection of privacy have to be reasonable. Thus, even though the European Court 
of Human Rights has explained that «the notion of ‘private life’ within the meaning 
of Article 8 of the Convention is a broad concept…,»4 which «is not susceptible to 
exhaustive definition»5, but it is definitely connected with various rights, such as 
the right to personal development,6 right of living privately, away from unwanted 
attention7 and these rights are protected if a reasonable expectation that their pri-
vacy would be respected exists.8
Furthermore, similar flexible attitude to the right to privacy is reflected in the 
Euroepan Union legislation. For example, in the preamble of the GDPR it is stated 
that «The right to the protection of personal data is not an absolute right; it must be 
considered in relation to its function in society and be balanced against other funda-
mental rights, in accordance with the principle of proportionality.»9 
So, as the use of UAS and dashboard cameras cannot be denied and the fact 
that the right to privacy is not absolute has been supported by the examples above, 
1 General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 1: 2.
2 Flaherty, D.H. (1984). Privacy and Data Protection: An International Bibliography, London: Mansell.
3 Niemietz v. Germany, December 16, 1992, § 29, Series A no. 251-B.  
4 M.M. v. Russia, no. 7653/06, ECHR 1237  
5 Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan [GC], no. 40167/06, § 255, ECHR 2015; Sidabras and Džiautas v. Lithuania, 
nos. 55480/00 and 59330/00, § 43, ECHR 2004-VIII.  
6 K.A. and A.D. v. Belgium, nos. 42758/98 and 45558/99, § 83, February 17, 2005  
7 Smirnova v. Russia, nos. 46133/99 and 48183/99, § 95, ECHR 2003-IX (extracts).  
8 Köpke v. Germany (dec.), no. 420/07, October 5, 2010  
9 General Data protection Regulation, supra note 1: 4.
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it is important to specify, what assures the achievement of the societal security and 
privacy balance.
2.2. Tackling illegal usage of image capturing devices
The most realistic and the most effective way of protecting subcets of privacy 
is threatening legal responsibility for the breaches of people’s privacy and clear and 
effective rules of the usage of image capturing devices. Such responsibility, as it was 
seen before, under national laws could be criminal, administrative and civil. After a 
concise review of Lithuanian and Latvian national legislations, it is obvious, that both 
countries made a great job in reconciling GDPR with their national laws. However, 
as Personal Data Processing Law and LPDLP set the requirements for data process-
ing by business entities or natural persons (for business purposes), it is obvious, that 
the biggest threat to people’s privacy are private users of image capturing devices, 
which do not fall under the provisions of the GDPR and, accordingly, Personal Data 
Processing Law (in Latvia) and LPDLP (in Lithuania). First of all, there is a lack of 
clear obligation for all users (including private ones) to mark themselves and their 
devices (UAS and cars in which dashboard cameras are used) (only Latvian legisla-
tion has moved forward in obliging such users to make themselves identifiable when 
operating UAS, but such obligation does not exist in regard to dashboard camera usage 
in both countries, therefore the cars in which dashboard cameras are used should also 
be marked with a special sign and contact details of the user). Furthermore, when 
clear obligation for the operators of image capturing devices to identify themselves 
and their devices being operated is fulfilled, the subjects of private information have 
to have possibility to express their disagreement with the action (as in Lithuania: the 
case law has formulated the provision that a clear expression of disagreement (verbal 
or non-verbal) prohibits the disclosure of information collected). Taking into consi-
deration specificity of dashboard cameras (that even if a subject of private information 
is informed about the private information being collected (in other words, about video 
surveillance being carried out) but the right of disagreement with the operation could 
be hardly implemented as the cars move fast and in a traffic flow the subjects of pri-
vate information may not even notice that they are being filmed), a clear prohibition 
for natural persons to use records or make them public taken by dashboard cameras 
must exist (with exceptions of public interest, and help to reveal the circumstances of 
various violations – to courts, preliminary investigation institutions or police). 
Furthermore, it is worth considering the fact that the UAS or dashboard ca mera 
could be used by natural persons for various illegal purposes, such as spying. So, the 
video taken shall not be made public, but the operator will achieve his/her unlawful 
goal at the same infringing someone’s right to privacy. In such situation the injured 
person will not have a chance of proving that he/she was being spied on. Therefore 
administrative national acts on the usage of UAS must strictly forbid using the 
devices in residential neighbourhoods and above private territories1 and for such 
breaches strict administrative fines must be set.
1 The Rules do not contain prohibition to fly over a private territory if it is not in a town, city or 
densely populated area. 
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Conclusions. After the comparison of two legislations governing the same ques-
tions of privacy and usage of UAS and dashboard cameras, it is clear that national 
laws, even both being in accordance with one – European Union legislation – could 
protect the same value with different legal tools. Each legislation – Lithuanian and 
Latvian – has its own advantages and disadvantages, but what could be confirmed 
is that the law does not always go in step with the quick development of technolo-
gies. As it has been seen, with particular adjustments concerning identification of the 
users of UAS and dashboard cameras, with introduction of legal tools allowing the 
injured party to efficiently defend their privacy in cases when the personal informa-
tion users are persons gathering someone’s private information for non-commercial 
purposes, the right balance between the two values – societal security and privacy – 
could be found.
The advantages of the new technologies could not be denied, therefore it would 
be absurd to say that they are not necessary as causing to much danger to our pri-
vacy. And privacy as a value could not be absolute. Therefore it is essential to adapt 
legal mechanisms to the changing threats to the main values, such as privacy. Thus, 
the lack of legal measures could not be the reason to interfere with technological 
development: not the new technologies should be treated as a threat, but legal norms 
should be improved and adjusted to the constantly changing world.
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Приборы, фиксирующие изображения: угроза или благо?
Авторы статьи «взвесили» преимущества и угрозы вмешательства в частную жизнь, воз-
никающие в результате использования беспилотных летательных аппаратов (дронов) и видео-
регистратора. Анализируя и сравнивая законодательство двух географически, исторически и 
культурно близких стран – Латвии и Литвы, они указывают на различия в законодательном уре-
гулировании вопросов конфиденциальности, проблемные аспекты их действующего национального 
законодательства по использованию технологий и защите частной жизни, а также предлагают 
возможные решения по урегулированию выявленных правовых пробелов.
Ключевые слова: беспилотные летательные аппараты; дроны; видеорегистраторы; соб-
ственность; Латвия; Литовская Республика.
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